Monday, March 19, 2007

Money - Following the Money - Part II

What might have happened?

What you always wanted know about fraud and embezzlement but were afraid to ask
Following are excerpts from Polices & Procedures to Prevent Fraud and Embezzlement – Guidance, Internal Controls, and Investigation, a book published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. in 2006 written by Edward J. McMillan, CPA, CAE

1. Who Embezzlers rarely fit a stereotypical image and almost always someone above suspicion.
2. Why Despite the appearance of honesty in their personal life they are desperate people capable of taking desperate action and have a gambling issue, alcoholic and/or substance abuse problem or are experiencing financial difficulties.
3. The Fraud Triangle From the “Statement of Auditing Standards Number 99” of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, for fraud to occur the Fraud Triangle of incentive, opportunity and rationalization is present. Incentive (See why above with an employee experiencing financial difficulties), Opportunity (To much trust, poor internal controls, lack of supervision by supervisors, no financial audit by independent CPAs). The basis purpose of effective controls is to remove the opportunity for fraud. Rationalization (Over time the embezzlers are convinced they are not stealing, but rather self-correcting a perceived wrong such as a pay discrepancy or the like.
4. How They Get Caught Despite belief to the contrary, most fraud is discovered by accident and due to unanticipated work interruptions. CPAs financial audit 2% - The embezzler knows the auditors routines and what its supervisors look for and do not look for. The auditor engagement is to render an opinion on fairness and accuracy of the financial statements and not to uncover fraud.
Results of internal audit 18% - A good internal audit program is very effective if effective established procedures and internal controls are followed between annual audits.
Whistle blowing 30%
Luck of by accident 50% - Stumbling into something or the thief’s careless accounts.
5. The Financial Services and Accounting Department Most internal embezzlement schemes and other financial related difficulties involve someone assigned to an accounting function such as handling checks, cash, deposits, bank statements and reconciliation, payroll preparation, payroll tax deposits and employees with sole custodian of accounting records. Also the incidents of accounting irregularities are greatly increased if the person assigned to these function is not an accounting specialist by training, education and certification.
6. When Most embezzlements take place during the “window of opportunity” that is open between the time the CPA has concluded the audit field work for one year and the time the auditor starts the subsequent annual audit.

In the case of the MVF “misdirected- suspicious transfer” All 6 conditions excerpted from Mr. Mc Millan’s book were present creating a perfect storm for financial disaster, a trusted long term accounting department employee, with financial problems, apparently solely responsible for “managing its benefits program” embezzling funds after the audit field work for 2004 was completed.

What we know about the MVF employee retirement and saving plan
Note 8 B (Employee benefit plans – Retirement and Savings Plan) to the “Notes to Financial Statement of the audit of the financial statement of Montgomery Village Foundation, Inc. for the year ending December 31, 2001 states “ The foundation makes a fixed contribution fo 2% of salaries and wages to the retirement savings plan. In addition, if the employee elects to defer a percentage of their pay the Foundation will make matching contributions as follows:
Employee Elective Deferral 2%, 3%, 4%
Employer Matching Contribution 3%, 4%,5%

The maximum employer match is 5%. Employer contributions to the plan were $94,537 in 2001.”

How do these plans work?
The administration of “retirement and saving plans” is normally a function of the payroll accounting and record keeping department of a large scale community association such as MVF using a payroll service company and/or the payroll module of its in-house accounting program. The benefit program, the savings funds and individual retirement and saving accounts are normally maintained and managed under contract by a benefit or investment management firm as the fund manager.

It is common practice to establish a payroll transfer bank account as the depository of the gross payroll including the employer’s cost of payroll taxes and fixed and matching employer contributions to the retirement and saving funds are deposited each payroll period. Logging on to a web based computer program of the fund manager the total of the current employee withholding retirement fund contribution and the employer’s fixed and matching contributions are posted to each individual employee’s account balance and simultaneously wire transferred to the fund manager. For larger employers federal and state income fax employee withholding and employer social security contributions are paid as a function of the withholding tax reporting system by electronic transfer knows as “impoundment”. Any payroll or tax and benefit expenses not paid at the end of the monthly accounting period is usually recorded on the books and records as a current liability.

So what do you think happened?
The 2007 payroll budget for salary and wages is $3,011,092. If the assumption that the total of the payment to benefit and saving fund is 6% of salaries and wages, the annual contribution would be approximately $180,000 or $15,000 a month. Remember the employer pays a 2 % fixed contribution for eligible employees. Each employee can elect a deferral amount from 2 to 4% and MVF contribution a matching contribution from 3 to 5%. In 2001 MVF contributed $94,537 so it would be reasonable to assume that the total employer-employee contributions to for 2001 would be $150,000 to $160,000. If we assume MVF electronically transmitted the contributions monthly to the benefit and retirement fund, it is a good possibility that the “fraudulently transfer of $13,684 from the MVF retirement fund” was the March 2005 “retirement and saving” transfer normally electronically transferred to the benefit manager.

Such a misdirected transfer could go unnoticed even if others employees were responsible for balancing the bank statements, producing the financial reports and performing other balancing and internal control procedures. All bank, payroll and general ledger accounts would appear in order until the 2005 audit is conducted in the spring of 2006.

On page 15 of the 2004 MVF Annual Report in the section on Finance and Administration it is written “The department underwent several changes during 2004. The financial affairs supervisor served as interim director until the new director (Geraldine Barber) was hired in December 2004. During the transition, staff readily assumed additional responsibilities to keep the department running. Fixed asset, payroll and COBRA software was upgraded.” There were plenty of changes, distractions and stress on the remaining and new staff to assume the “unauthorized transfer” would probably go undetected for at least a year.

Normally the benefit manager provides a variety of paper and on-line monthly, quarter and annual reports to its clients and employee enrollees to the benefit and savings plan. During the annual audit payroll transactions and balances from the fund including individual employee transacts and balances would be examined to ensure all payments from MVF accounts were received and properly transmitted and posted.

If the audit uncovered the "unauthorized transfer" why wasn't it disclosed?

If the “suspicious and unauthorized transfer” was discovered during the course of the 2005 audit, should this have been reported and prominently noted as part of or during the audit process? Should it have been included as an employee receivable; as part of the “Notices to Financial Statement” Note 8 B, Employee benefit plans – Retirement and Savings Plan”; Note 10 “Concentrations of credit risk”? Should it have been a reported condition in the Management Letter as a concern or weakness of the internal controls when the draft audit was first presented to the board of directors?

It's your turn to post your questions and comments and E-mail this blog post to your Montgomery Village e-mail list

Wednesday, March 7, 2007

Financial Reports - MVF The Financial Report - Follow the Money!

What do you think really happened?

According to written reports it took 460 days to discover that MVF cash funds under the care, control and custody of MVF staff were missing, misdirected, stolen and or embezzled. The event was first publicly reported by the embattled staff writer of The Gazette Sebastian Montes in its February 7, 2007 edition that a police warrant of a former MVF employee accused of fraudulently authorizing transfer of $13,684 from MVF retirement fund. Seven (7) months latter in the February 16, 2007 issue of the Village News , The Official Newsletter of Montgomery Village Foundation, Inc., reported that the “Employee theft was shocking, but audit and internal investigations averted financial loss, …the financials are clean and No funds will be lost and MVF retirement accounts and all other foundation accounts are in order” (Lois Campbell, Interim Treasurer); “Arrangements have been made to recover all of the funds, plus interest.(Keith Silliman, Interim MVF President) and “…the auditors, local police and Board of Director have worked together to make everything right”. (Pat Huson, Interim EVP). Everyone has questions but as Pat Huson, Interim EVP stated in response to Marilyn A. Cadoff, a CPA and a resident of The Points in her questions on the embezzlement “The staff is excellent, details of the loss will not be given since the case is not yet entirely closed and Ms. Cadoff can go apply for membership on the MVF Audit Committee.” Let’s list the questions and speculate about the answer.

How and who discovered this unauthorized transfer? Why did it take so long to discover that MVF funds were fraudulently transferred and take action after the discovery?
What and who knew and when did they know it?
What can we say about MVF’s financial management systems and practices?
What can we say about MVF’s Board of Directors oversight and communications of financial matters?

The “gap” between discovery and resolution

On July 11, 2006 (Day 460) the Gazette reported John R. Zakian alerted police to “the suspicious transfer, according to police reports”. How long before Zakian was aware of the situation? Heaven knows, John was a promoter and public relations type and didn’t have the skills or desire to supervise a petty cash account let along be in charge and take responsibility for a community with $ 9 million in assets and a $6 million budget. As Sebastian Montes, the “annoying” staff writer for the Gazette, wrote on August 2, 2006 Day 481, that soon after Zakian left his job as executive director of the Yonkers (N.Y.) Industrial Development Agency/Job Development Corporation (1984 to 1993) his secretary at Yonkers was accused of embezzling $350,000 and pleaded guilty to a lesser charges. Zakian told the Gazette he was the one who realized his secretary had written checks to herself and said he was unfairly blamed for failing to discover the embezzlement, which should have been uncovered in an audit. We could give John credit for “Embezzlement Reduction”, as embezzlements under his watch declined from $350,000 to $13,000 but I don’t think he uncovered the theft, he only provided the environment that encouraged such things to happen.

Not withstanding Pat’s Huson’s comments above about “details about the loss will not be given”, as reported in the Village News President’s Message column “The discrepancy was noted approximately a year later during the 2005 Audit” in April of 2006. That would mean a “gap” of at least 81 days between the “notation” of the discovery by the auditors and when Zakian “alerted police to the suspicious transfer”.

This only increases the quantity of unanswered questions about handling and condition of the financial and fiscal affairs of the Foundation as well as the creditability of those with power, duty and obligation in such matters.